Isis and other demons (part 2)

Date: 2014.09.10 | Category: in english | Tags: Daash,gaza,iraq,isis,jacobin,syria

once again this is an english translation of this article. All the nice english prose (and all the gratitude) is attributed to the translator and all the errors to the deteriorating pidgin english I use the last few years to communicate here in germany)

Our beloved isis- or daash (Dulat al-Islam fi al-Iraq wal-Sham) as it is better known by locals- is following in footsteps la grande peur of the jacobin revolution. With public displays of terror and a narrow interpretation of who is on our side (ie who is a good muslim), is going about in central and nothern Iraq making new friends.

In the beginning, some of the sunni fractions had seen them as an opportunity to gain ground against the central government, while they were far away, near the syrian border. The occupation of mosul and of other cities around it was a typical case. The grenadiers of daash made ​​the initial attack, while the locals would follow behind them essentially taking command of the area. The various mass executions, the blasting of shia mosques and government official’s residencies that followed were literally a display of power. And we can admit that it worked very well. Hundreds of thousands of immigrants have left their homes, in order not only to avoid the fighting, but also the fanaticism of the winners. Opponents were filled with fear because of the mass executions of the prisoners. On the other hand, the same terror and the glory of the winner was used to recruit new fighters both among locals and the from the far west.

At the same time, however, many of the locals realized that coexistence with daash was not so simple. Daash served as “the useful idiot” of those locals, but as the time went by, this distinction became more muddy and less clear. After all if the fractions in baghdad finally came to some sort of understanding among them, it doesnt mean that daash would voluntarily withdraw back to syria. So today, among the factions within Iraq that supported daash, we clearly have two camps. The conservative and the radical. The first is as much terrified of the caliphate as were their opponents they originally wanted to get rid of. Either because they did not believe that daash had a plan of its own, or because living together in the same cities with daash made ​​them nostalgic of the predictability of a central government. The radicals on the other hand, are those who have decided that the coexistence with the central government of Iraq is not at all desirable and therefore a new state should be created. Along with them are all those touched by the romantic dreams of utopia of the new caliphate who flee away from far west and gather inside the borders of the new state to experience what they see as a dream. This is also a very european cultural feature if we remember how lord byron crossed the whole of europe (with a small pause in switzerland which contributed to the creation of frankenstein) to go and fight in muddy mesologi for what he saw as the noble cause of the greek revolution against the ottoman rule.

Personally I can not blame the remaining residents of fallujah and tikrit for their decision. When the americans flattened fallujah showering it with phosphorus shells, they supposedly did it in collaboration with the predecessor of the current government. Yes, allawi, who served at the time as interim prime minister (that is a subtle way to say dictator), was the favorite child of the americans, but I can forgive the people who then resisted being unable to distinguish the difference. Especially as various shia militias are not necessarily known for their unitary spirit. The work of the americans in iraq in the two years before they got their butts kicked out of the country, had precisely this purpose: the complete separation of a state, based on the religious doctrine of islam. If you see a map of baghdad before the american occupation and after you will get a very clear picture 🙂

Daash exiting Syria

The fact that daash exited syria had a lot to do with the military and political situation there. In part because of the insurgents, who later on formed daash, assad eventually managed to gather around him enough support, even from many who may not have liked him, but did not want to come under the rule of the new revolution. Such messages came from syria for over a year, but few in the west had understood that the extent of the zeal of the rebels was not only a result of assad’s propaganda.

It was clear that the kurds initially, but later on several fractions of the rebels themselves too, stopped asking for “help” from the jihadi revolutionaries. And this denial shows how friendly a relations there was in between the jihadists and some of the local insurgents. In civil wars, where rebels try to overthrow the central government, it is critical for them to have bases and secure areas in other countries where the military can not persecute them. In syria’s case, this role was played by turkey (with great fervor) and jordan (only later on, when the americans and the saudis decided to open a second front against assad). But the help package coming out of those countries (weapons and money) included also jihadi rebels. If the local rebels were to refuse the help from the jihadists (money, weapons and expertise they brought with them), that would practically lead to a defeat in the civil war.

Naturally, in various western media, one would often read serious articles and field reports about how the west was trying to overthrow assad giving weapons and money to the ‘good’ rebels. But this is all just bullshit as the largest part of the funding came from the arab world. And this time, unlike in afghanistan in the 80’s,the arab oil kings had much clearer plans in their minds than to harm the atheist but distant soviet evil empire. The west of course supplied weapons without asking too many questions, assuming that they will get rid of assad. How could poor francois (hollande) have known that jihadists from libya, flying accidentaly to turkey with american cargo planes would turn from “good” to “bad” rebels? After all, he had been reassured that they possessed the highest of european moral values​​, as many of them were coming from all the greatest cities of the far west.

The puzzle is somewhat completed, if we add the contribution of hizballah on assad’s side, rather late though in the course of the civil war. I admit that at first I had seen this as puzzling, despite their friendly relations- hizballah aims for the stabilization of lebanon and practically is the semi-official lebanese army. Being sucked into battles at syrian cities near the borders (quite critical and bloody ones too) on the side of assad, doesn’t really match its profile. And when I say profile I do not mean the absurdities we read in the anglo-saxon, mainly, media, about hizballah being “the long arm of iran” and all the other gibberish israeli-saudi propaganda they monkey-like repeat. Hizballah, both before and especially after their great victory against the israeli army in 2006, has a very clear focus and rarely deviates from it.

In light of current developments, however, it is evident that hizballah fighting alongside assad was just a way to prevent the establishment of a radical caliphate. Its position in the neighborhood helped them to understand, much faster than us westerners, the existential threat it would be for lebanon if syria was to fall in the hands of daash. After all they know all to well themselves how the saudis promoted (and still do) with boatloads of money certain political figures inside lebanon (such as the murdered former president hariri).

So, while in syria rebels start to lose the civil war, at the same time some of their parts completely alienated from the local population, a fraction among them (those who would later become daash) decided to leave syria, aiming for greener pastures. Iraq -in their view- was a more appropriate place for the spreading of the revolution. So iraq was basically a way out for defeated jihadists in syria. Based on either promises from the locals, that the various tribes of western iraq will support them, either from intelligence and wishes of their sponsors, they began to descend the river.

What the situation is like today

The fractions in Baghdad found a way to get along. This is evident both from the political and the military developments. Currently, the kurds, and some sunni fractions, are fighting against daash, together naturally with what’s left of the iraqi army and the shia militias. Of these militias, only the one of sadr, maintain a constant unitary narrative. Bear in mind here, that sadr, when Americans showered fallujah with phosphorus, launched an uprising in the south in order to support the citizens of fallujah, despite the fact that they were sunnis and quite possibly saddam-friendly. The other fractions follow their own sectarian narratives, of different shades and intensity. So their de facto collaboration, due to the collapse of the iraqi army, does not tell us many positive things about the unity of iraq, despite the fact that ali al-sistani (the cleric with the greater weight of opinion in shia iraq) in almost all of his declarations (which are only marginaly political ) speaks of a united iraq.

The same goes for the kurds, who apparently received significant gifts and promises in order to start their assault against daash. Those gifts may involve the control of kirkuk, direct sales of oil through turkey, funding from the central government or a combination of such incentives. The kurds, after all, even when their benefactors (us army) invaded iraq in 2003 and begged them to open a second front in the northeast of the country, made very careful movements and very selective sacrifices. They came down from the mountains only after the iraqi army abandoned its positions. So their evident involvement in battles against the daash tells us that a) they consider daash as an opponent that can be relatively easily overcome and / or b) their stars seems to collide for an even greater autonomy from the central iraqi state.

Despite these developments, daash shows no obvious signs of collapse. It is clear that it has significantly retreated from the positions obtained 10 days after the conquest of mosul, but it is equally clear that there are cities, like tikrit, where daash has the undeniable support of the locals. At the same time, it is doubtful that the shia militias will be willing to go much further north from where shias reside. The same goes for the kurds and their territories. The kurdish army, moreover, despite their more “western values” , and their decades of cooperation with the israelis and the americans, continues to be an army based on a rather tribal society, with its own rules. And those rules while complex definitely do not suggest: “hey, we should run 500km away from home to defend a desert that is not even ours”. And this makes the situation even more complicated, because it is very likely that these gaps leave an “empty” geographical area, controlled by the caliphate. And let’s not forget that daash message of “liberty or death”, has its own allure which motivates their supporters far more than most monetary or tribal tie. After all it was the great french invention of the citizen-soldier that made napoleon conquer nearly the whole of europe, not his big guns or loads of money. (an invention non-europeans would find all too disturbing in the coming years after the napoleonic wars, but thats another story not so unrelated with this one)

And the Takfiri cries Takfir

My magic crystal ball says that the daash tactic can offer the movement a lot of motivated fighters,but does not offer many alliances with the locals. This may well grant some military victories, but probably will deprive the winning strategy, which is to establish a caliphate (even an enclosed one) with the support of the saudis and other coalition of the willing members. The policy of terror, as the jacobins also found out, offers many advantages so the sovereignty of the new power is quickly established, but at the same time alienates locals and pushes foreigners to create alliances, which would not be feasible without the threat of the jacobins to begin with. That is exactly what we see the past few weeks; a silent coalition between the iranian, the iraqi kurds and the americans on the battlefield. Even the saudis, the fore-(and god)-fathers of the project, seem alarmed and this mixed mood was obvious during the last visit of the iranian minister of foreign affairs to saudi arabia.

Here we need to note that daash kills mostly muslims, but not only shia -who are regarded by the wahhabis dissidents and therefore infidels (kafir)- but anyone who all together disagrees with them. To be able to justify these killings in an religious context, it uses the argument of excommunication (takfir). According to islam, a good muslim is not allowed to kill the believers of the book (jews and christians), but most of all other muslims. The only way to justify the killing of a muslim by another muslim, is when the dead is considered a dissident, an apostate, and therefore an infidel. And that is the only way the death is accepted in the islamic community (ummah).

But the fervor and the radicalism of daash is such, that anyone who disagrees with them for any reason is very quickly and easily accused of takfir, and thus targeted for murder. I have read testimonials from many sources on the friction between the radical and the locals, in a perfectly predictable pattern. Because the entire daash movement carries a postmodern irony. Consider now a daash follower, grown up in a suburb of birmingham, or in north africa, commenting on how women are dressed e.g. in a community with a millenium long muslim tradition. And it is exactly this kind of postmodern insult that makes the locals revolt when newcomers and fresh jihadists remark on how to behave properly. Hence daash’s main weapon is terror. But the argument of excommunication is a double-edged sword. Because to kill a muslim who is not ostracized by the entire ummah, is in itself a clear case in which the murderer is considered himself an apostate. So it is possible that very quickly their sect-tactic may backfire, as it did in various parts of syria.

Is it all this important? Of course it is, because it is part of the propaganda (ie the hearts and minds war). Unlike western fantasies, where a bearded priest dressed in black starts preparing a sermon and at the end the fidels pour into the streets like ants to practice his preaching, ummah is much more fragmented. And I mean not only between sunnis and shias, but also the dogmas themselves seem to be divided. So the fatwa that is issued by a mufti priest can have a varied impact. And this is a phenomenon as old as the religions. The french catholics would impale on sight any french protestant (huguenots), but at the same time had no desire to blindly follow the orders of the pope. The same applies to islam. If during the first half of the great european war (1914-1918) one was to count how many fatwa were issued about which army the good muslim should support, he would probably have some serious religious consciousness problems. The same goes for today. The jacobins of daash are blaming everyone else for apostasy, when at the same time everyone else is reciprocating the allegation.

The evidence referring to the ongoing recruiting of new members are increasing. Whether from the palestinian refugee camps in lebanon and the rebellious areas in syria, or from the far west- those who could be called “the jihadists of the xbox era”. The success and the jacobinism of daash act as a catalyst. Even the brand name of al-qaeda is not as strong or radical anymore. When the leader of al-qaeda himself accused daash for sectarianism and excessive radicalism, the eager new members did not to be intimidated. On the contrary it acted like a magnet. Besides, the winners are always popular. Especially the winners with deep pockets.

Yet another invasion of Gaza

So every indication so far points out that the new civil war in iraq will not be so short. Daash still finds allies, despite the fact that all the stars collide against them. Something of course that suits perfectly israel’s apartheid and its allies in the us establishment who seem to control firmly us foreign policy. And this new very convenient situation, was celebrated by bibi netanyahu with a new massacre in the concentration camp called the gaza strip. This slaughter was entirely predictable, as the strategy of the israelis in gaza is clearly an attempt to control the number of the population. The good israeli farmer, every once and a while, has got to get rid of the weeds growing in the backyard called gaza. This sort of social engineering -according to the naive but very strong narrative- palestinians will remain a cheap labor force, the number of which at least should not increase, since one cannot get rid of them completely. A not at all new racist policy, as for over 20 years israel almost officially states that for every dead israeli there should be multiple dead palestinians, assuming that arabs are excess (and of course inferior beings).

All these are good old racist notions of the 19th century, which you could hear in all the upper-class tea rooms of London about the poor from the east end, and which the israeli society unfortunately has adopted in its nearly complete entirety. The opposing voices in israel, trying to remind the consequences of those racist attitudes in the 20th century, are so sadly limited and lonely, one fears that the angry mob, apart from the outrage and the insults towards them, decides to lynch the small counter-demonstrations against the invasion of gaza.

It is characteristic of the political situation, that the reactions to bibi’s policy by the members of his government, relate almost exclusively to the low numbers of massacres that he has done and how much of a pussy he is not giving an end to this problem once and for all.

But despite the slaughter of the dark skinned palestinians, which concerns almost none of the western media (except to show how the usual compassion for this unlucky events), the situation is very different. As with the israeli-lebanese war of 2006, the israeli army has been defeated, behind the victory cries that are heard from all around. It is now evident, that the resistance does not allow the camp guards freedom of movement and whenever the israeli army sets its foot in gaza, it leaves with scores of dead and without necessarily achieving the tactical objective. And this fact, as in lebanon in 2006, is much more important than the propaganda that calls victory the murder of a few thousand civilians.

Because it is now clear to the israeli headquarters, that the good old days are over. The days when the israeli army invaded lebanon in ’82 and did exercises with live ammunition on the “army” of arafat or the bombing of the iraqi nuclear facilities belong to the glorious past.

The label of the invincible israeli army, a terribly important label to any army, has now faded so much, that its opponents are not afraid to try their teeth on it. And this has had -and will have in the future- a significantly larger impact on the security of israel, than all the dead civilians that pile up after each of their invasions.

That is why the ceasefire was expected. The israeli army had come to a point of flattening entire buildings mostly to take revenge on the families and neighbors of hamas members. But leveling buildings does not necessarily offer any special tactic advantage. All it offers is blood for the hungry masses, without any dead israeli soldiers, as the bombing is done from a secure distance with artillery and airplanes.

It’s nice to show that your bombs have a GPS, as it is nice to advertise that your alleged anti-missile shield works (the truth is that it is rubbish,just as the corresponding american one -the neo-con’s wet dream of first strike doctrine). But the only thing that really works, is the inability of hamas to build rockets able to hit even marginally their objective. And so, while hamas is striving to make something primitive corresponding to the remote control war played by the israeli army, the war has stalled. When the situation arrives to that point, obama and the international community will call both sides to restrain themselves. This truce will save bibi from the “what should i do now” humiliation, while hamas will come forth as the sole palestinian political movement that does something for each slaughter until the next time, and so becomes the de facto spokesman of the palestinians.

An interesting question is whether the existence of the new caliphate will pull people out of gaza and into the new movement. It is a generation that grew up under constant bombing. The certainty that half your friends will die or will be in an israeli dungeon before they turn 20, evidently creates a generation of fighters who do not fear death. Exactly as the first jews who came to israel directly from german concentration camps. For israel, to get rid of this tough generation, which humiliates their ‘invincible’ army is the main objective. The proportions of racist notions of the 19th century are not random. So if hamas loses control of this generation and they spill over into the new caliphate, israel could more easily continue with the “weeding” which is now starting to get scary, as the weeds seem to bite back.